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Abstract
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997, henceforth SGU) prove that in a standard neo-
classical growth model the scal increasing returns induced by the endogenous factor
income tax rate (assuming that the government expenditure is exogenous) has a close
correspondence with the production increasing returns in Benhabib and Farmer (1994)
model. Wen and Aguiar-Conraria (2005, 2006, henceforth WAC ) extend the Benhabib-
Farmer model to open economy by introducing imported foreign production factors. We
prove that in a modied WAC model without increasing returns, using the tari¤ revenue
from the imported production factor to nance the exogenous government expenditure,
we can also have indeterminacy. From this perspective, factor income tax and tari¤
share similar channels to generate indeterminacy.
Chapter one of my Ph.D dissertation. It should be the joint work of my advisor, Prof. Jess Benhabib,
who initiates this project and corrects several mistakes as I write this paper. I also thank Wen Yi, Pierpaolo
Benigno, Paul Dower, Martin Uribe and Viktor Tsyrennikov for their valuable comments. Correspondence:
Zhang Yan, Economics Department, New York University, NY, 10003, USA. Tel.:1-212-992-9777; E-mail
address : laurencezhang@yahoo.com (Y. Zhang). For a recent extensive survey of the literature, see Benhabib
and Farmer (1999).
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1. Motivation
Benhabib and Farmer (1999) provide the sources of the indeterminacy and sunspots in
macroeconomics (pp 390):
"Sunspots cannot occur in nite general equilibrium models with complete
markets since their existence would violate the rst welfare theorem; risk averse
agents will generally prefer an allocation that doesnt uctuate to one that does.
Examples of departures from Arrow-Debreu structure that permit the existence
of sunspots include (1) incomplete participation in insurance markets as in the
OLG model, (2) incomplete markets due to transactions costs or asymmetric
information, (3) increasing returns to scale in the technology, (4) market imper-
fections associated with xed costs, entry costs or external e¤ects, and (5) the
use of money as a medium of exchange."
Tari¤ as a special kind of tax (or a kind of transaction cost in international trade) can
also be a source of the indeterminacy.
The channel of the indeterminacy generated by the factor income taxes in a one sec-
tor neoclassical growth model was challanged by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997). In their
model, they conclude that, "Under a balanced budget rule the rational expectations equilib-
rium may exist. In order to obtain this result, the presence of the endogenous distortionary
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taxes is crucial: it is straightforward to show that endogenous uctuations are impossible
when the balanced budget rule consists of xed income tax rates and endogenous govern-
ment expenditures."
Do tari¤ and factor income taxes (in SGU model) deliver indeterminacy in the same
way? This paper gives a positive answer. Wen and Aguiar-Conraria (2005, 2006) extend
the Benhabib-Farmer model into an open economy by introducing imported foreign factors
of production. They show that reliance on foreign energy has a potentially important e¤ect
on economic activity, it destabilizes the economy by increasing the likelihood of indetermi-
nacy, making uctuations driven by self-fullling expectations more likely to occur. Leung
(1999) presents an endogenous growth model in which the tari¤ revenue collected from the
imported production factor nances the government expenditure in a small open economy.1
Endogeneous tari¤ rates are also used by Loewy (2004) and Mourmouras (1991) in a two-
country open economy endogenous growth model and a small open economy OLG model
respectively. This approach originates from Ramsey (1927).
Following similar methodology as SGU, we present another reason why a balanced-
budget rule can be destabilizing. We embed a balanced budget rule into the open economy
version of Benhabib and Farmer model without increasing returns in the production side
and assume that the scal authority nances a pre-set level of expenditure with the tari¤
revenue.2 We show that under this type of policy, persisitent and recurring uctuations in
1The revenue motive behind the imposition of trade taxes is well documented. See, Kindleberger and
Lindert (1978, p. 143), and Riezman and Slemrod (1987). Recently, Manoj Atolia (2006) used the tari¤ and
income taxes revenue to nance the government public investment.
2For simplicity, we assume that the government doesnt impose the consumption taxes or factor income
taxes on the goods or production factors. Adding other taxes changes nothing as long as part of the
exogenous spending must be still nanced by the tari¤ on the imported factor. See Velasco(1996) for a
similar explanation to scal increasing returns induced by taxes on domestic capital.
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aggregate activity become possible in the absence of shocks to the fundamentals. Speci-
cally, under a balanced budget rule, the rational expectation equilibria can be indeterminate
and stationary sunspot equilibria may exist. Thus, an endogenous tari¤ rate could also be
a source of scal increasing returns.
To show the main result of the paper analytically, in section 2, we consider a simple
case in which government expenditures are constant and the only source of the government
revenues is from the tari¤.3 We adopt the assumption that labor is indivisible, as in Hansen
(1985) and SGU (1997). We show that the necessary and su¢ cient condition for a balanced
budget rule to generate indeterminacy requires that the steady state tari¤ rate is greater
than the share ratio of capital and imported factors in the production function and is less
than a critical value .
From a policy standpoint, my results suggest that if the proposed balanced budget
rule for the European countries is to avoid endogenous aggregate instability, it should be
combined either with restrictions on the government ability to change the tari¤ rate in
response to innovations in the state of the economy or with a reduction in the level of tari¤
rates currently in place. Relating the current high tari¤ rate prevailing in EU in 2002,
some countries like Denmark and Netherlands, which are economies quite dependent on the
imported exhaustible natural resources, can be easily pushed into destabilization.4 I use
the WACs estimation of the imported goods share in the two countries and nd that the
high tari¤ rate on oil in the EU leads the two countries into destabilization.
3The tari¤ revenue in this model can also be interpreted as oil tax revenue. Miguel and Manzano (2006)
consider a small open economy, in which the government nances an exogenous ow of public spending by
using consumption and oil taxes and by issuing debt.
4Although throughout the paper, we did the numerical case for the developed countries, the results also
hold for the less-developed countries which productions are dependent on the imported factors.
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Similarly, the energy taxes which the EU countries have tried to impose recently also
bring the potential dangers of destabilization into those countries which are economies
largely dependent on imported non-reproducible resources. Those countries like Denmark
and Netherlands whose production are heavily dependent on the imported factor of oil
should pay close attention to the control of energy taxes in order to stabilize the economy.
This is particularly true when we regard the energy taxes as the optimal tari¤ rate since
David Newbery (2005) says the energy taxes seem to be very high in some EU countries.
In sections 3 and 4, we compare our model with Benhabib and Farmer, SGU and WAC
models and nd that (1) the indeterminacy condition obtained here also has a close corre-
spondence with the one obtained in the increasing returns model of Benhabib and Farmer
(1994); (2) if the imported factor is mainly a labor substitute, the indeterminacy may not
easily arise; and (3) the larger the imported energy share in GDP, the easier it is for the
economy to be subject to multiple equilibria. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Basic Model
This is a modied open economy version of Benhabib-Farmer model without increasing
returns. There are two production sectors in the economy, the nal goods and the in-
termediate goods sector. The nal goods sector is competitive and uses a continuum of
intermediate goods to produce nal output according to the technology.
Y = (
Z 1
i=0
yi di)
1

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where  2 [0; 1] measures the degree of factor substitution among intermediate goods. Let
pi be the relative price of the ith intermediate good in terms of the nal good, the prots
of the nal good producer are given by
 = Y  
Z 1
i=0
piyidi
First order conditions for prot maximization lead to the following inverse demand
functions for intermediate goods:
pi = Y
1 y 1i
The technology for producing the intermediate goods is given by
yi = k
ak
i n
an
i o
a0
i
where the third factor in production, non-reproducible natural resources, ot, is imported,
and ak + an + a0 = 1 (constant returns to scale without externality or increasing returns
in BF or WAC models).5 Assuming the rms are price takers in the factor markets, the
prots of the ith intermediate goods producer are given by
i = piyi   (r + )ki   wni   po(1 + )oi
where (r + ) denotes the user cost of capital, w denotes the real wage, and po denotes the
5The model is based on the standard DSGE models that incorporate foreign energy as a third production
factor. This class of models have been used widely to study the business-cycle e¤ects of oil price shocks.
This literature includes Finn (2000), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), Wei (2003), Aguiar-Conraria and
Wen (2006).
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real price of the imported good.6  is the tari¤ rate imposed on the imported good, such as
oil, which is uniform to all rms. The intermediate goods producers are monopolistically
competitive facing downward sloping demand curves for intermediate goods, hence the prot
can be written as
i = Y
1 yi   (r + )ki   wni   po(1 + )oi
This function will be concave as long as (ak + an + a0)  1: Prot maximization of
each intermediate goods producing rm leads to the following rst order conditions
r +  = ak
piyi
ki
w = an
piyi
ni
po(1 + ) = a0
piyi
oi
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have ni = n, ki = k, oi = o, yi = y = Y , i = , pi = 1
and
 = Y   (
Z 1
i=0
yi di)
1
 = 0
6 2 (0; 1) denotes the depreciation rate of capital, rt is the rental rate of capital.
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 = (1  (ak + an + a0))Y = (1  )Y
Perfect competition in nal goods will make the rms earn zero prots and impefect
competition in the intermediate goods sector leads to positive prots if  < 1:
The government collects the tari¤revenue to nance its expenditure as in SGU. The tari¤
rate is endogenous and we assume that the foreign input is perfectly elastically supplied, i.e
, po is independent of the factor demand for oi .
poo = G
A representative consumer maximizes the utility function that SGU and WAC adopt:
1X
t=0
t(log ct   bnt)
subject to
ct + st+1 = (1 + rt)st + wtnt + t
where st is aggregate saving. Here the aggregate factor payment, po(1 +  t)oi goes to the
foreigners (pooi) and the government (po toi). The rst order conditions with respect to
labor supply and savings are given by
b =
wt
ct
1
ct
=
(1 + rt+1)
ct+1
8
In equilibrium, st = kt, and factor prices equal marginal products, the rst order con-
ditions and the budget constraint then become
bnt =
1
ct
anyt (1)
1
ct
=
(1   + ak yt+1kt+1 )
ct+1
(2)
ct + kt+1 = (1  )kt + (1  a0)yt, yt = kakt nant oa0t (3)
po tot = G (4)
We can substitute out o in the production function using
ot = a0
yt
po(1 +  t)
to obtain the following reduced form production function:
yt = Ak
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0
t (4a)
where A = ( a0po(1+ t))
a0
1 a0 as the "technology coe¢ cient" in a neoclassical growth model,
which is inversely related to the foreign factor price and endogenous  . In this reduced-
form production function, the "e¤ective return to scale" with respect to the capital and
labor is measured by
9
ak + an
1  a0 = 1
This A term generates scal increasing returns since the tari¤ rate now is regressive
with respect to the output. We can see this because po tot = G =
 ta0yt
(1+ t)
implies @@y < 0.
Proposition 1. If the tari¤ rate is exogenous, the model doesnt display increasing returns
to scale since A term is a constant. (in this case, the government expenditure is not
exogenous under the balanced budget rule)
Proposition 2. If the government expenditure is exogenous, the tari¤ rate is regressive
with respect to the tax base (poot); or the output, under the balanced budget rule, i.e.
@
@y < 0:
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From these propositions, we can see that the countercyclical tari¤ rate (@@y < 0) can
induce increasing returns to scale with respect to capital and labor. Guo and Harrison (2004)
illustrate that under perfect competition and constant returns-to-scale, Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribes indeterminacy result depends crucially on a balanced-budget requirement whereby
the tax rate decreases with the households taxable income. In our model, we get a similar
result that requires the countercyclical rate to generate indeterminacy.8 Once we x the
tari¤ rate (or oil tax rate) like Miguel and Manzano (2006), the model doesnt display
increasing returns to scale, so indeterminacy cannot arise.
7This relation doesnt violate the evidence of a negative relationship between tari¤s and growth, especially
among the worlds rich countries like those in EU, which is documented by David N.Dejong and Marla
Ripoll,2005)
8 In order to compare our model with BF, SGU models,under perfect competition in factor and product
markets, we use the continuous time model in the next subsection to show this point. We also think that
the progressive tari¤ rate may make the economy against the sunspots in WAC model.
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To facilitate interpretation of this model, we map the current model with the inter-
mediate goods into a one-sector Benhabib and Farmer (1994) competitive model without
production externalities, in which the aggregate production function is replaced by
yt = k
ak
t n
an
t o
a0
t
and the reduced form production function is replaced by
yt = Ak
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0
t (4a)
where A = ( a0p0(1+ t))
a0
1 a0 ,  = 1. With this change in the framework, the rst order condi-
tions, budget constraint of the household and the government balanced budget requirement
become:
bnt =
1
ct
anyt (1a)
1
ct
=
(1   + ak yt+1kt+1 )
ct+1
(2a)
ct + kt+1 = (1  )kt + (1  a0)yt (3a)
G =
 ta0yt
(1 +  t)
(*)
Note that the international trade balance is always zero. Foreigners are paid in goods.
This is clear in equation (3a), according to which domestic production is divided between
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consumption, investment, imports and government expenditure (ct +it +potot + G = yt,
it = kt+1   (1   )kt). So part of what is produced domestically is used to pay for the
imports. This is the interpretation of Finn (2000), Wei (2003) and Aguiar-Conraria and
Wen (2006) in similar models.
It can be easily shown that a steady state exists in this economy for reasonable level
of government expenditure. To study indeterminacy, we substitute yt by utilizing equation
(4a) and (*) and log linearize equations (1a)-(3a) around the steady state. This gives (here
the  ss denotes the steady state value of the endogenous tari¤, see appendix B).
^
yt =
ak
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
kt +
an
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
nt (4b)
note that ak+an1 a0(1+ss) > 1, increasing returns to scale comes from the endogenous tari¤ rate.
[1  an
1  a0(1 +  ss) ]
^
nt =
ak
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
kt   ^ct (1b)
^
ct+1   ^ct = [1  (1  )][( ak
1  a0(1 +  ss)   1)
^
kt+1 +
an
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
nt+1] (2b)
(1  s) ^ct + s

^
kt+1 = [
ak
1  a0(1 +  ss) +
s(1  )

]
^
kt +
an
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
nt (3b)
where s is the adjusted steady-state saving rate (investment to national income ratio) given
by
12
s =
k
(1  a0)y =
ak
(1  a0)(1  (1  ))
The above system of linear equations can be reduced to
M1
2664
^
kt+1
^
ct+1
3775 =M2
2664
^
kt
^
ct
3775
where
M1 =
2664 M1;1  f1 + [1  (1  )] an(1 a0(1+ss) an)g
s
 0
3775
M2 =
2664 0  1
s(1 )
 +
ak
1 a0(1+ss)(1 +
an
(1 a0(1+ss) an)) s 
(1 a0(1+ss))
(1 a0(1+ss) an)
3775
where M1;1 = [1  (1  )][( ak1 a0(1+ss)   1) +
anak
(1 a0(1+ss))(1 a0(1+ss) an) ]
We propose a numerical case based on WAC 2005 model without increasing returns:
ak = 0:09, an = 0:7, ao = 0:21,  = 0:025,  = 0:99:9 Suppose the steady state tari¤
rate in the country for oil import is  ss = 0:6, the two roots of the matrix B = M 11 M2
are 0:5738  0:5496i, with modulas 0:7945. We have multiple equilibria induced by the
endogneous tari¤ rate. The high tari¤ rate ( import tari¤import price =
15:6$=bbl
26$=bbl = 0:6 optimal tari¤ rate
of oil from David Newbery (2005)) is consistent with the EU in 2002.10
9 In this numerical case, following WAC( 2005), we set a0 = 0:21 which is the cost share of foreign inputs
in domestic production in Netherlands. Here we assume that the tari¤ rate in Netherlands is 0.6 (the one
in EU, 2002, calculated by Newbery 2005.) Implicitly, we assume that the cost share a0 keeps unchanged
throughout the years.
10 In an exercise paper of Chen and Zhang (2008), we introduce intrinsic uncertainty in the form of
exogenous productivity and government purchases shocks into this model and investigate the propagation
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The conclusions in the model also hold for the energy taxes. As we see, the energy
taxes11 as the optimal tari¤ argument12 are relatively high in some European countries. For
instance, oil is heavily taxed in Denmark, the e¤ective tax rate on domestic fuels exceeds 0.8.
It will push the Denmarks economy into destabilizing easily. (ak = 0:1, an = 0:7, ao = 0:2,
 = 0:025,  = 0:99 based on WAC 2005 ,  ss = 0:8, two roots are 0:8591 0:3387i).
2.1. Steady State and Local Indeterminacy
In order to derive analytical formulas of the indeterminacy conditions and facilitate the
comparison with Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and SGU (1997) models, we transform our
model into continous time. The present discounted value of the lifetime utility, ( 2 (0; 1)
is the subjective discount rate in the continuous time model )
Z 1
0
e t(log ct   bnt)dt
subject to
:
kt = rtkt + wtnt   ct
mechanism of sunspot and fundamental shocks under a balanced-budget rule in the tari¤ model. Following
SGUs method, we nd that neither the rst-order serial correlations, the contemporaneous correlations
with output, nor the standard deviation relative to output of tari¤ rate, output, hours, and consumption is
a¤ected by the relative volatility of the sunspot shock or its correlation with the technology shock. Therefore
it validates the equivalence between the factor income taxes (in SGU) in closed economy and the tari¤ in
open economy, in the sense that they share similar propagation mechanism of sunspot and fundamental
shocks under a balanced-budget rule.
11 the energy tax revenue is overwhelmingly oil tax revenue in some EU countries, see David Newbery
(2005).
12 the need to correct externalities such as global warming.
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where r = ak
y
k    is the rental rate of capital minus depreciation rate ( the government
doesnt transfer the tari¤ revenue to the agent, instead consumes this revenue by itself),
the rst order conditions become
1
ct
= t
b = tw
:
t = (  r)t
where t denotes the marginal utility of income. The single good is produced with a Cobb-
Douglas production technology with three inputs : yt = k
ak
t n
an
t o
a0
t ( or yt = Ak
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0
t
where A = ( a0po(1+))
a0
1 a0 ). Perfect competition in factor and product markets implies that
factor demands are given by:
wt = an
yt
nt
rt +  = ak
yt
kt
and
po(1 +  t) = a0
yt
ot
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Market clearing requires that aggregate demand equal aggregate supply, that is,
ct +G+
:
kt + kt + otp
o = yt
Government expenditure (a pre-set constant level) satises: G = po tot. When we
replace the consumption with 1t , transform wage rate and rental rate into functions of
capital and labor, the equilibrium conditions can be reduced to four equations:
b = tanAk
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0 1
t (5)
:
t
t
= +    akAk
ak
1 a0 1
t n
an
1 a0
t (6)
:
kt = (1  a0
1 + 
)yt   kt   1
t
 G (7)
and
G =
 ta0yt
(1 +  t)
; yt = Ak
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0
t (8)
We rst claim that for a given tari¤ rate, a steady state exists and is unique ( same logic
as SGU, government expenditure is endogenous in this case). Secondly, we claim that the
number of tari¤ rates that generate enough revenue to nance a given level of government
purchases can be 0, 1 or 2 ( for the endogenous tari¤ rate case: see the appendix B).13
13SGU (1997) show that the revenue maximizing tax rate is the least upper bound of the set of taxes rate
for which the rational expectations equilibrium is indeterminate. But in our endogenous tari¤ rate case, this
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Consider the log linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions (5)-(8) around the
steady state. Let t,
^
kt,
^
nt,
^
 denote the log deviations of t, kt, nt and  from their
respective steady states. The log linearized equilibrium conditions then are
0 = t    ss
^

1 a0
a0
(1 +  ss)
+
ak
1  a0 (
^
kt   ^nt) (9)
:
t = (+ )[
an
1  a0 (
^
kt   ^nt) +  ss
^

1 a0
a0
(1 +  ss)
] (10)
:
^
kt = [(1 a0) (+ )
1  a0(1 +  ss)   ]
^
kt+
an(+ )(1  a0)
ak[1  a0(1 +  ss)]
^
nt+[ + (1  a0)
ak
(+ )]t (11)
^
yt =  
1
1 +  ss
^
 =
ak
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
kt +
an
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
nt (12)
Combining the (9) and (12), we can imply
^
nt =
t
ak
1 a0   ss1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss)
+
ak
1 a0(1+ss)
ak
1 a0   ss1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss)
^
kt
Using this expression to eliminate the
^
ntin the (10) and (11) results in the following
system:
property doesnt hold.
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2664
:
t
:
^
kt
3775 =
2664 J11 J12
J21 J22
3775
2664 t^
kt
3775 ; J =
2664 J11 J12
J21 J22
3775
where
J11 =  (+ )
an
1 a0 +
ss
1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss)
ak
1 a0   ss1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss)
J12 = (+ )f[ an
1  a0  
 ss
1 a0
a0
ak
1  a0(1 +  ss) ] 
[ an1 a0 +
ss
1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss) ]
ak
1 a0(1+ss)
ak
1 a0   ss1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss)
g
J21 = [  + (1  a0)
ak
(+ )] +
an(+)(1 a0)
ak[1 a0(1+ss)]
ak
1 a0   ss1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss)
J22 = [(1  a0) (+ )
1  a0(1 +  ss)   ] +
ak
1 a0(1+ss)
ak
1 a0   ss1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss)
an(+ )(1  a0)
ak[1  a0(1 +  ss)]
Proposition 3. The equilibrium is indeterminate i¤ trace(J) = J11 + J22 < 0 < J22J11  
J12J21 = det(J), or,
ak
a0
<  ss < 
 = [(+)an(1 a0) anak][(+)a0(1 a0)+a0ak]
The indeterminacy requires that trace(J) = akak a0ss (+)  < 0 if and only if  ss >
ak
a0
After some manipulations, the determinant of the Jacobian can be written as
det(J) =
(+ )
ak   a0 ss f(an+ a0 ss) 
(+ )
ak   a0 ss [an(1  a0)  a0 ss
1  a0
ak
(1  a0(1+  ss))]g
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The positive det(J) requires that ( conditional on ak a0 ss < 0), G( ss) = [ (+)a
2
0(1 a0)
ak
+
a20]
2
ss    ss[ (+)a0(1 a0)
2
ak
+ a0(ak   an)] + [(+ )an(1  a0)  anak] < 0, we nd that
G(aka0 ) = 0, G(0) > 0, the necessary and su¢ cient condition of G < 0 is
ak
a0
<  ss < 
 (13)
where  = [(+)an(1 a0) anak][(+)a0(1 a0)+a0ak] >
ak
a0
A su¢ cient condition for the set of tari¤ rates satisfying (13) to be nonempty is that
the labor share is larger than the capital share (i.e., an > ak).
The economic intuition behind the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria in the
presence of a balanced budget rule is quite straightforward. Suppose that agents expect
future tari¤ rates to be above average. This implies that, for any given capital stock, future
oil imports and the rate of return on capital will be lower (the latter is due to the fact that
the marginal product of capital is increasing in the oil input). The decrease in the expected
rate of return on capital, in turn, lowers the current oil demand, leading the current output
decrease. Since the tari¤ rate is countercyclical @@y < 0, budget balance requires that the
current tari¤ rate increase. Thus expectation of an above steady state tari¤ rate in the
next period leads to higher current tari¤ rate. For certain choices of the parameter values,
namely those satisfying aka0 <  ss < 
, the expectation of an above steady state tari¤ rate in
the next period leads to an increase in tari¤ rates today that is larger than the one expected
for next period. Furthermore, for such parameter values, the tari¤ rate in period 0 is larger
in absolute value than the tari¤ rate in period t0 > 0, so that the sequence of tari¤ rates
converges to the steady state and thus can be justied as an equilibrium outcome.
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To help understand the intuition, consider the consumption Euler equation (in discrete
time for ease of interpretation) as follows:
ct+1
ct
= (1   + ak yt+1
kt+1
) = [1   + (1 +  t+1) 
a0
1 a0 rbtt+1]
where rbtt+1 = ak(
a0
p0
)
a0
1 a0 k
ak
1 a0 1
t+1 n
an
1 a0
t+1 denotes the before-tari¤ return on capital,  t+1 the
tari¤ rate in period (t+ 1). Householdsoptimistic expectations that lead to higher invest-
ment raise the left hand side of this equation, but result in a lower before-tari¤ return on
capital rbtt+1 due to the diminishing marginal products. The countercyclical tari¤ rate can
increase the right hand side of the equation, thus validating the initial optimistic expecta-
tions.
3. Comparison with Benhabib-Farmer Model
The indeterminacy condition obtained above also has a close correspondence with the one
obtained in the increasing returns model of Benhabib and Farmer (1994). In both models, a
necessary condition for local indeterminacy is that the "equilibrium labor demand schedule"
can be upward sloping and steeper than the labor supply schedule. In the Benhabib-Farmer
model, the equilibrium labor demand is upward sloping due to increasing returns in the pro-
duction function. In my model, on the other hand the equilibrium labor demand is upward
sloping because increases in the aggregate employment are accompanied by decreases in
the tari¤ rate. The labor demand function can be written as (in log deviations around the
steady state):14
14Here we should emphasize that the
^
wt denotes the log deviation of the after-tari¤ wage rate from the
steady state.
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^
wt =
ak
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
kt +
 (ak   a0 ss)
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
nt
Based on aka0 <  ss < 
,  (ak a0ss)1 a0(1+ss) > 0 the labor demand function now is upward
sloping. Since the aggregate labor supply is innitely elastic (for a given tari¤ rate and
marginal utility of income), in our case
^
wt =
^
ct, the labor demand schedule will be steeper
than the labor supply schedule whenever aka0 <  ss < 
.
4. Comparison With SGU and WAC model
SGU proved that within a standard neoclassical growth model, a balanced budget rule can
make expectations of higher tax rates self fullling if the scal authority relies on changes in
labor income taxes to eliminate the short run scal imbalances. People will naturally think
if the import factor is a labor substitute, the endogenous tari¤ rate imposed on imported
oil will make the indeterminacy arise more easily. Although in the above sections, we follow
WAC to assume that the imported factor is mainly a substitue for capital, we can not
eliminate the possibility that imported factor is a substitute for labor.
We get the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If we assume that the imported factor is mainly a labor substitute instead
of a capital substitute, which means ak = 0:3, an+ a0 = 0:7 (instead of an = 0:7, ak + a0 =
0:3), the indeterminacy may not easily arise in the labor substitute assumption.
Example 2. we give a simple example to prove this proposition. Let a0 = 0:2 as we did
in the numerical case, an = 0:5, the necessary and su¢ cient condition becomes
ak
a0
= 1:5 <
 ss < 
 = [(+)an(1 a0) anak][(+)a0(1 a0)+a0ak]  2:5. Compared with the case we did before: imported
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factor is capital substitute, ak = 0:1, an = 0:7; a0 = 0:2, the necessary and su¢ cient
condition is aka0 = 0:5 <  ss < 
 = [(+)an(1 a0) anak][(+)a0(1 a0)+a0ak]  3:5. The former case will not
make the indeterminacy more easily to arise since empirically speaking, tari¤ rate cannot
be that high (exceeds 150%).
From this proposition, we can see that although the channel of the tari¤ to deliver inde-
terminacy is similar as the one of the factor income taxes, they have di¤erent implications
in generating indeterminacy. We can say that the "equivalence" relationship between them
only holds through scal increasing returns by endogenizing rates and making the govern-
ment spending exogenous. WAC nd that if imported factor is a substitute for labor, then
a larger a0 has the same qualitative consequences (meaning the degree of the externality
decreases), although less dramatic. Here we nd that if imported factor is a substitute for
labor, then a larger a0 will need a larger tari¤ rate to generate indeterminacy.
WAC show that heavy reliance on imported energy can have a signicant e¤ect on
economic instability in the presence of increasing returns to scale: the larger the imported
energy share in GDP, the easier it is for the economy to be subject to multiple equilibria.
We have the similar proposition below:
Example 3. Given an = 0:7, ak + a0 = 0:3 (the imported goods is capital substitute), the
larger the imported energy share in GDP, the easier it is for the economy to be subject to
multiple equilibria. Since the lower bound of the indeterminacy region aka0 <  ss < 
 =
[(+)an(1 a0) anak]
[(+)a0(1 a0)+a0ak] decreases as a0 increases, it makes indeterminacy arise more easily
under the scope of empirically reasonable tari¤ rates.
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5. Conclusion
We explore the "channel equivalence" between the factor income taxes and tari¤ to gener-
ate indeterminacy. The channel is through scal increasing returns by endogenizing rates
and making the government spending exogenous. In the two sector model without scal
increasing returns induced by the factor income taxes, Bond, Wang and Yip (1996) and
Meng and Velasco (2003) prove that distortionary factor taxation nonetheless causes inde-
terminacy in a closed-economy, endogenous growth model and a small open RBC model
respectively. Does the "channel equivalence" between factor income taxes and tari¤ still
hold in a small open economy two sector model? This is one issue which deserves our further
research.
Another future task is to see whether plausible parametrization can generate the kinds
of economic uctuations that we observe in real-life economies. This will show that this
source of instability is not just a theoretical possibility but also occurs for empirically
realistic parameter values. We plan to pursue this line of research in the future.
6. Appendix:
6.1. Appendix A: The discrete time model:
(i) G =  ta0yt(1+ t) implies (G a0yt)
^
 = a0yt
^
y, after some algebra, we can see that
^
yt =   11+ss
^
 .
(ii) At = ( a0p0(1+ t))
a0
1 a0 implies
^
At =   ss
^

1 a0
a0
(1+ss)
(iii)
^
yt =
^
At +
ak
1 a0
^
kt +
an
1 a0
^
nt =
ak
1 a0(1+ss)
^
kt +
an
1 a0(1+ss)
^
nt
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6.2. Appendix B: The continuous time case:
Claim 1. The steady state in the continuous-time dynamic system (5)-(8) exists, given the
proper level of government expenditure.
We can derive steady state kn = (
+
akA
)
1 a0
 an ,  = banA(
+
akA
)
ak
an , k =
anA
b
( +
akA
)
  akan
[
1 a0
ak
(+) ] , G =

(1+)
an+a0
an
constant= F (), constant=
(
a0
po
)
a0
an a0(+)an(
+
ak
)
  akan
akb[
1 a0
ak
(+) ] . We can see F () is non-
monotone and the number of positive tari¤ rates that generate enough revenue to nance
a given level of government purchases can be 0, 1 or 2.
(iv) J11 =  ( + ) anak a0ss , J22 = ( + )
1 a0
ak a0ss   , J12 = ( + )
 ssa0
ak a0ss , J21 =
(+ ) (1 a0)ak
1 (ss+1)a0
ak a0ss   
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6.3. Appendix C: Close form correspondence
In this appendix, we show that there is a close correspondence between the equilibrium
conditions of the model with a balanced-budget rule, distortionary tari¤, and constant
government purchases presented in this paper and that of the endogenous business cycles:
the distortionary income taxes model in SGU (1997). Consider the case with tari¤ rate.
The balanced-budget rule is then given by
G =
a0yt
(1 + )
The following equilibrium conditions hold for both two models (in discrete time),
Uc(ct; nt) = t
Un(ct; nt) = wtt
Yt = ct + kt+1   (1  )kt
1 = 
t+1
t
(1   + rt+1)
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constaint of the household. In the
balanced budget model, disposable income, Yt; is given by
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Yt = (1  a0)yt = yt   p0ot  G
G represents a xed cost that ensures that imperfectly competitive rms do not make pure
prots in the long run ( given that the foreign rms take away their payments). The
after-tari¤ wage rate wt, and the after-tari¤ rental rate rt are given by
rbtt = ak(
a0
po
)
a0
1 a0 k
ak
1 a0 1
t n
an
1 a0
t = trt
wbtt = an(
a0
po
)
a0
1 a0 k
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0 1
t = twt
rbtt ; w
bt
t denote the before-tari¤ return on capital and labor. In the balanced budget
model, t represents the wedge between marginal product and after tari¤ factor prices
introduced by distortionary tari¤. Specically,
t = (1 +  t)
a0
1 a0 = (1  1  a0
a0
G
Yt
)
  a0
1 a0 = (
G
Yt
)
We can see that the markup t is countercyclical with respect to yt.
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